SEG 29.127 Rulings of Marcus Aurelius resolving legal disputes

Rulings of Marcus Aurelius resolving legal disputes

SEG 29.127 Date: 174/5 AD

First stele

Fragment 1

. . . son . . . . . . shall be done. . . . . . . the mighty man (i.e. Herodes) . . . ^[1] . . . to nourish . . . (5) . . . of Herodes . . . . . . is straightened . . . . . . they might depart. Succession . . . . . .

Fragment b

. . . . . . . . . of calm . . . . . . (5) . . . for safety . . . . . . for I see . . . . . . of the master of the . . . . . .

Fragment c

. . . . . . and to . . . . . . to be banished . . . . . . is pained at the Athenians . . . (5) . . . I stood firm; it was decided . . . to an island . . . ^[2] . . . and tangled, as heavy to the . . . . . . was contrived . . . . . . Euodos son of Onesimos, who without . . . ^[3] . . . having contrived . . . (10) . . . I . . . since not even to the former ones . . . . . . he shall keep away from his fatherland and its islands. . . . ^[4] . . . of the mighty man (i.e. Herodes), yet also a slave, Lysis or resolution not . . . . . . to those who were done nothing seemed to separate, I would like . . . . . . they waited until I delivered my opinion on these matters continuously . . . (15) . . . the accusations (enklēmatōn) presented above and below. Since the . . . . . . having been at my judgement and especially for the very . . . . . . falling short of . . . the mighty man (i.e. Herodes) privately . . . . . . I give Ofillius Ingenuus as [judge (dikastēn) . . . ]^[5] . . . having been done . . .

Fragment d

. . . differ . . . . . . beyond and the . . . . . . they have received from the . . . . . . nor the freedmen (apeleutherous) . . . (5) . . . those after these matters, who . . . . . . at the Agora . . . . . . just men of the Athenians . . . . . . of Herodes and . . . . . .

Fragment f

. . . . . . . . . . . . the scrutiny (exetasin) . . . ^[6] (5) . . . indeed . . . . . . and . . .

Second stele

Fragment e

(1) [Appeals (ekklētoi), which] Ael(ius) Praxagoras, Cl(audius) Demostratos, and Ael(ius) Themison made against Ael(ius) Dionysios [are shown] to be justified, [so it was] necessary to hold these appeal trials (epheseōn). It was decided that it was enough to [know] the elections (archairesias) were held in accordance with the law (enthesmōs), and I did not consider it to be necessary that [judgement (krisin)?] of these men take place, due to it not having happened in Athens either. [For] next time, however, in order to leave no doubt, those voluntarily seeking the post of Dadouch or any other (5) priesthood greater than what they have got already, must first surrender the headband (strophion) (of that priesthood) in accordance with the law, but if anyone should be called up [by] the People, there will be no grounds for dispute against him, if the previous symbols are not surrendered before it is accepted. Once elected, however, he too will surrender the priesthood previously belonging to him.^[7] (2) Appeals (ekklētoi), which Sentius Attalos and Klemes son of Klemes and Claudius Chrysippos made from the court (dikastēriou) and from the king (basileōs) Cl(audius) Eupraxides against Valerius Mamertinus will be closed (perigegrapsontai).^[8] So, since Mamertinus, although he is a Eumolpid, had no (10) parent on either side from the genos of the Kerykes, he lacks the only means by which those from one of these [two] gene are allowed to transfer to the other. He will desist from seeking the position of sacred herald (hierokērukeias). But the elections between the others – both those who have already received judgement in their favour (epidikasamenōn) and those who now intend to announce their candidacies in accordance with the laws of the Athenians – will be resumed. Mamertinus will not be removed from the number of the Eumolpids and will recover his priesthood. But this idea, which came to me after I had reached my verdict (gnōmēn) on the present case (dikēs), should not [in] (15) future confuse the careful observance of the rules.^[9] (3) Ladikos son of Polyainos the appellant (ekkeklēmenos) against Sophanes son of Sophanes from Julius Damostratos the archon of the Panhellenion has clearly been called for judgement (krisin) already in the set time within which it is possible to challenge those elected as Panhellenes and, having been denied, since, although the election happened after the traditionally fixed time, he had not yet reached the legal age and had not held any magistracy (archēn) at any point previously, as the God my grandfather (i.e. Emperor Hadrian) ordained, he seems (20) to have appealed unjustifiably.^[10] (4) Epigonos son of Epiktetos, having appealed (ekkalesamenos) from Julius Damostratos against Eudemos son of Aphrodeisios, will have his trial (agōnieitai) before my Quintilii regarding his membership (koinōnias) in the Panhellenion. Indeed, he himself asked to be sent to get judgement from them, and it is clear that many of the aspects pertaining to me in the affairs of Greece will be completed by them.^[11] (5) Athenodoros son of Agrippas, having appealed from Papius Rufus, who was archon of the Panhellenes in the previous five-year-period (pentetēridos), against the administrators (dioikētas) of the mighty Cl(audius) Herodes, since he (25) provided neither the minutes (hupomnēmata) of the Panhellenes nor the verdict (gnōmēn) that was delivered, will have his trial before my Quintilii, so that he not be compelled after so long to wait for the moments in which it is possible for me in the midst of my military activities to decide matters requiring judgement.^[12] (6) Nostimos son of Dionysios did not show that he has become an Areopagite in accordance with the laws, but if there is in this matter a way that he is able to be enrolled in the Areopagos Council, the Quintilii will decide.^[13] The grounds on which he could be expelled from the membership (koinōnias) of the council (sunedriou) of the Panhellenes, [seem to have been] (30) demonstrated by me, when I decided the appeal (ekklētou) against Euphras son of Nikon.^[14] (7) Popilius [Pius] remains in legitimate possession (dikaiō) of Athenian citizenship (poleiteias), as the Areopagites recognised, [for] confirmation of the status is necessary for him and for the others who, seeking the permission (exousiai) granted in the event of destruction [of a] certified copy (antigraphou), presented their just claims to the Areopagites. But in the future, [in accordance with] the laws and in accordance with the ancestral customs (patria ethē) it will be carefully monitored and scrutinised (dokimasthēsetai) whether someone is an [Athenian] (35) by descent.^[15] (8) Appeal (ekklētos) which Ael(ius) Praxagoras made from Gavinius Saturninus, in connection with the trial (dikēs), in which, once the ‘codicils’ in the name of Stratolaos had been brought forward, the investigation (zētēsis) took place, is shown to be legitimate. If, however, within two months after the reading of this letter in Athens, anyone should wish either publicly or privately to enter into a case (dikēn) about the gift, which they purported to be owed to the city, this shall be permitted to him, with the scheduled time (prothesmias) for judgement by my Quintilii being set (40) within two more months, but if this does not occur within this interval, no one may attempt to take up the controversy at a later time. Praxagoras will return to possession of the estates and will get arbitration (diatētēn) about their profits (karpōn) from the mighty Quintilii. As for the estates, which were said to have been left to the mighty Herodes, he will now return to them. About the profits (karpōn), Ingenuus will judge. But if Praxagoras complains about the slowness of the transfer (paradoseōs), the matter will be brought forward by the leaders of the people (tōn hēgemonōn tou ethnous). In response to the petition (deēsei) of the (45) Athenians, which they presented on account of the father’s age and him being the only man left to the house, I would be able to allow that Pheidimos be summoned back from the island to which he was exiled for scrutiny (exetasin) of the matter, but that he stay outside the borders of Attika in the future.^[16] (9) Agathokles son of Agathokles’ claim (axiōsis) for the embassy, [which] he is carrying out before me: it will indeed be repaid by his fatherland and the board (sunedriō) of the Areopagites,^[17] along with the deposits (egguai) of the appeal cases (ekklētōn dikōn), which the administrators (dioikētai) of the estates of the mighty Herodes brought against Ael(ius) Ameinias; likewise also the deposits (egguai) of the appeals (ekklētōn), which (50) Ael(ius) Praxagoras, Cl(audius) Demostratos, Ael(ius) Themison, Sentius Attalos, Klemes son of Klemes, Valerius Mamertinus, Ladikos son of Polyainos, Euodos son of Onesimos, Nostimos son of [Dio]n[y]sios, Popilius Peius made for the cases (dikais) they argued before me, will be repaid. I said previously that Epigonos and Athenodoros’ appeals (ekklētous) had to be closed (perigegraphthai).^[18] If any other appeal trials (epheseis) dependent on this judgement, about which I did not rule, have occurred before publication (apophaseōs) (i.e. of these decisions), they will close (perigegrapsontas) them, to be scrutinised by the judge (dikastēi) on the same terms (55) as they were going to be scrutinised on and with no right to an appeal case (ekklētou dikēs); Ingenuus will write to me regarding whose cases these may be. If any cases were delivered after the decision (gnōsin), he will hear them in the appropriate order.^[19] (10) How much concern I feel for the reputation of Athens, that it possess its ancient awesomeness (semnotētos), I think I have made clear enough also when I attempted to restore its selective board (sunedrion) to its ancient custom (ethos), according to which they accepted into the Areopagos only those (60) who met the standard of the three-generation rule (trigonias);^[20] and if only there were a surfeit of glorious clans (genōn), so that it were possible for me even now to continue to maintain our position (gnōmēn), but since they, taking into account the events that have happened by chance, in response to which I know many other cities have petitioned urgently for a remedy,^[21] must on the one hand return to benevolence regarding the past and on the other hand make things viable (autarkōs) for the future, having agreed with the Athenians to this extent, I will concede to them, regarding the past, to focus only on whether (65) someone’s father is well-born (eugenēs), and even if it should appear that one of the members of the Areopagos ought to be expelled under the three-generation rule, he will recover the rank (axiōma), and after this it will be enough that someone be well-born from both generations or both parents (ex amphoin tōn goneōn). For those who are sons of a freedman father and have broken into the Areopagos after our letter, it is time to desist from their folly. If, however, anyone born of a freedman father was not expelled before my letter by any court (dikastēriou) capable of returning a verdict on these matters, he will stay.^[22] Any who, after our letter, on account of their (70) grandfather having been a freedman, either were removed from the Areopagos Council or voluntarily renounced the honour (timēn), are still barred. However, those who withdraw from the board for the aforesaid reasons in future should not on account of this be disturbed from participating in other honours (timas) and ranks (taxeis). If there should be anyone enrolled contrary to our commands, who cannot sit in the Areopagos after the decision (gnōsin) that has now been delivered, they shall depart from it within a year, and whoever continues to remain even after this has been announced [or even] (75) worms in contrary to what has been written above, will be ranked equal to those expelled by the court (dikasteriou), [both] in lesser matters from this and in pursuit of the lesser ranks and honours.^[23] If any of the Areopagites currently among the Panhellenes should be found unable to fulfil the three-generation rule, they will not be expelled from the board due to this, but in future no one else from the Areopagites will be enrolled among the Panhellenes except those who are able to enter the elections (cheirotonias) because they fulfil the three-generation rule. Regarding the Council (80) of the Five Hundred, it is enough that it be arranged so that those who are enrolled are themselves well-born.^[24] (11) Ingenuus himself will be the judge (dikastēs) for the disputes from both of the parties and he will also judge for those taking care of the estates of the mighty man (i.e. Herodes) against any who make no counter-claim themselves. Those who have administered the public money (dēmosia chrēmata) of the city and owe accounts (logismous) have my Quintilii as judges, before whom the Athenians’ legal representatives (sundikoi) will take care to present their own sums in full.^[25] (85) Ingenuus will judge those Athenians needing a judgement (kriseōs) at Eleusis and Piraeus, at whatever time he wishes at each, while for those from Sparta he will fix a place in the nearby cities, in accordance with what he himself determines to be most convenient.^[5] (12) I think that it is clear from what I have declared that I have provided for each matter not from authority (exousias) more than from concern, in order that in future it may be possible for Herodes to participate with shared happiness in divine and human affairs among the Athenians, with his famous zeal for education (paideian), and that the Athenians, (90) remembering the once-famed generosity of the mighty Herodes towards themselves, may renew the warmth (tharsos) of their former relationship (oikeiotētos) with each other, for which they do not need me as mediator (diallaktou). For what could still linger in anyone’s opinion (gnōmēi) after erasing the memory of the causes for complaint (aitiais), given the service that has been rendered on all points, [so that] the Athenians could love Herodes, who is mine and theirs, since no other great matter still stands in the way of good will (eunoiai)? (13) However, once all these rulings about the judgements had been composed in the Greek language, (95) As for an additional matter I noticed that was omitted in what I had declared, capable of being inferred from my verdict (gnōmēs), even if not [from] the words of the declaration (apophaseōs), but requiring some exposition (exēgēseōs) so that no one would create a [new] dispute, I thought it was fitting to delineate this clearly: if someone born of freedman forefathers or parents left the Council of the Five Hundred, it shall be allowed for them to return for scrutiny (exetasin), on the same terms as for those from the Areopagos, and those from the (100) Council of the Five Hundred shall demonstrate that they themselves were born free, for it is not necessary that those born to freedman fathers be barred, but only those who are themselves freedmen, which matter is determined for the future regarding them .^[26] uninscribed space

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References:

SEG 29.127 (Translated text) (PHI)

Oliver, Marcus Aurelius 1

Ameling, Herodes Atticus II 189

Oliver, Constitutions 184

Translation by: Chris de Lisle

Images: Agora Excavations - (1, 2, 3)
Wikimedia Commons - (1)

Monument type: Stele

Inscription type: Letter (emperor)

fr. a1 - Findspot: Agora (Ag. I 4457)
fr. a2 - Findspot: Agora (Ag. I 4083)
fr. b - Findspot: Acropolis, north slope (Ag. I 5754)
fr. c - Findspot: Roman Agora, near the Tower of the Winds (Athens Ephoria ΡΑ 598a+b)
fr. d - Findspot: Roman Agora, near the Tower of the Winds (Athens Ephoria ΡΑ 753)
fr. e - Findspot: Roman Agora, Tower of the Winds (Athens Ephoria ΡΑ 755)
fr. f - Findspot: Roman Agora (EM 13366)

Transliterations on Places on

[1] Textual note: AIO mostly follows the text of SEG 29.127, which combines the text of stele 1 from Oliver, Marcus Aurelius with the text of stele 2 from S. Follet, Revue Philologique 53 (1979) 29-43. However, we also incorporate the updated readings of fr.a-d, f-g from C. P. Jones, ZPE 8, 1971, 161-83, namely, fr. b, l. 3 ἡσυχ̣ίας, c l. 8 ὃς ἄνευ, l. 16 κ̣[ρίσεως] "judgement" (rather than [λεχθείσης] "statement"). In fr. e ll. 1-2, it is unclear whether Aurelius declares that it is (SEG 29.127) or is not (Oliver, Constitutions; S. Follet, Bulletin Épigraphique 1991, no. 265 = SEG 41.68) necessary to hear the trials. At fr. e, l. 22 we follow J. H. Oliver, AJP 100, 1979, 543–558, ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλ̣[λάδος] "of Greece," where SEG 29.127 has ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπ̣[αρχείας] "of the province." At fr. e 32-33, AIO follows SEG 29.127, but Oliver, Constitutions restores ὑποφθο[ρὰν παθόν]|τι τά[φ]ου "[for one suffering] decay of a tomb," and Jones in N. Kennell, Class. Phil. 92, 1997, 359 proposed ὑπὸ Φο[υλουίου]| Τιτ[ιάν]ου “by Fu[lvius] Tit[ian]us” (on autopsy, neither of these alternatives seemed to fit the traces on the stone [CdL]). At fr. e, ll. 87-88, we follow Jones ZPE 8, 1971, 161-83 and Oliver, Constitutions ο[ὐκ ἀ]|π̣’ [ἐξ]ουσίας, rather than SEG 29.127 ο[ὐ διὰ] | πε̣[ρ]ιουσίας "not through abundance." We register debts to the translations of J. H. Oliver, Marcus Aurelius (1970) and Constitutions (1989), as well as C. P. Jones, ZPE 8, 1971, 161-83 and S. Follet, Revue Philologique 53 (1979) 29-43.

This long inscribed letter records a set of judgments on Athenian disputes that were delivered by Emperor Marcus Aurelius (r. 161-180 AD). On Marcus Aurelius and Athens see IG II² 3410 with notes and, on inscribed Imperial letters, see I Eleusis 513 with notes. This letter consisted of two stelae. The first is preserved only in fragments (fr. a-d, f). The second, found re-used as a paving slab in the Roman Agora, is almost complete. The context appears to be the 174/5 AD trial of Herodes Atticus before Marcus Aurelius at Sirmium (modern Sremska Mitrovica in Serbia, cf. fr. e ll. 26-27; for the date, see J. H. Oliver, Marcus Aurelius, 34-35). Herodes Atticus was a wealthy Athenian sophist and Roman senator (see AIUK 11 (Ashmolean), no. 15 with notes). Philostratos Vit. Soph. 2.1.7-8 says that Herodes was prosecuted by the Athenians for ‘tyranny’, had an emotional breakdown, and refused to offer a cogent defence, but was acquitted due to his personal relationship with Marcus Aurelius (he had been the emperor’s Greek tutor), who threw the blame on Herodes’ freedmen (cf. fr. e ll. 24, 49-50, perhaps also fr. e ll. 30-35, 57-80). Philostratos names the main prosecutors as Praxagoras, Demostratos, and Mamertinus, who appear in fr. e ll. 1-15, 35-47, 52 and are otherwise attested as prominent Athenians in their own right (see nn. 7 and 9). Herodes appears throughout the text (fr. a l. 3, 5; fr. c ll. 12, 17; fr. d l. 8; fr. e ll. 24, 42, 49, 82, and esp. 87-94), but the inscription presents a far more complex picture than Philostratos’ narrative. Marcus Aurelius resolves a range of appeals from several different courts (cf. K. Harter-Uibopuu, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 125, 2008, 214–250), some of which had been pending for years (cf. fr. e ll. 23-24); some may have been only tangentially related to Herodes. IG II² 3606, an inscribed poem, recounts Herodes’ triumphant return to Athens following the trial.

The first stele presumably contained the main judgement relating to Herodes Atticus, as well as an appeal from Herodes’ administrators against one Aelius Ameinas (l. 48, if these are not the same case), and resolved other appeals in the process (cf. fr. c l. 8; fr. e l. 30). The decisions on the second stele can be divided into thirteen sections, mostly concerned with entitlement to participate in councils and other institutions, arranged apparently in descending order of prestige. (1-2) relate to entitlement to Eleusinian priesthoods belonging to the genos of the Kerykes (see nn. 7-9); (3-6) relate mainly to the Panhellenion (see nn. 10-13); (7) deals with rights to Athenian citizenship by descent (see n. 15); (8) resolves an inheritance dispute with private and public aspects (see n. 16); (9) wraps up administrative matters relating to the various appeals (see n. 17-19)); (10) modifies a general rule regarding the participation of freedmen and descendants of freedmen in the Areopagos, the three-generation rule (trigonia, see n. 20); (11) summarises the judges assigned for outstanding matters; (12) is a general exhortation encouraging reconciliation between the Athenians and Herodes; (13) is an addendum explaining how the three-generation rule should apply to the Council (see n. 26).

The text is heavily shaped by Latin legal language and l. 94 may indicate that it was initially composed in Latin and then rendered into Greek during the process of compilation (Wankerl, Appello ad Principem, 2009, 17-68, cf. SEG 17.759, in which legal proceedings before the emperor Caracalla in Greek-speaking Antioch are conducted in Latin). Latin legal terms are generally rendered with Greek equivalents, but in one case a Latin term is employed (l. 36). [2] cf. fr. e, ll. 35-47. [3] Euodos recurs in fr. e l. 51, where he is allowed to reclaim his deposit. [4] Athens retained control of various Aegean islands in the imperial period (cf. SEG 30.82, ll. 19-20 with note). [5] Marcus Aurelius kicks back cases where further decisions need to be made to two separate authorities (summarised at fr. e, ll. 81-86). Ofillius Ingenuus is a specially appointed judge (iudex datus), who will decide cases between private individuals. He is not otherwise attested. Cases involving civic money or in which the city is itself a party are sent to Sextus Quintilius Condianus and Sextus Quintilius Valerius Maximus, a pair of brothers who had been consuls in 151 AD and administered Greece in the 170s AD, perhaps by combining the roles of provincial governor and procurator of the free cities (Oliver, Marcus Aurelius, 64-72) or as a corrector and his legate (W. Ameling, Herodes Atticus II, 1986, 189). According to Philostratos Vit. Soph. 2.1.7, they had opposed Herodes for some time. It may be due to this enmity between Herodes and the Quintilii that Ingenuus has been appointed for the private cases (Oliver, Marcus Aurelius, p. 41). However, Marcus Aurelius' confidence in them is clear from his aside at ll. 22-23 and his affectionate references to them as 'my Quintilii' (ll. 22, 25, 39, 84, cf. ‘my Herodes’ at l. 93). [6] Cf. fr. e, ll. 46 and 98. [7] Aelius Dionysios, presumably a friend of Herodes, served as Dadouch, the highest priesthood in the genos of the Kerykes, in the 170s and 180s AD (Clinton, Sacred Officials, 60-61, cf. Byrne, Roman Citizens of Athens, 12-13). Aelius Praxagoras was eponymous archon (154/5 AD) and eventually succeeded Dionysios as Dadouch (ca. 182-190 AD). He reappears in connection with the inheritance case at ll. 35-49 below. Claudius Demostratos his cousin and son-in-law, would be archon in 180/1 AD. They were both members of the prominent family known as the Claudii of Melite, which usually held the position of Dadouch, and are named by Philostratos as leaders of the prosecution of Herodes in the Trial at Sirmium (Vit. Soph. 2.1.7, cf. Byrne, Roman Citizens of Athens, 30-32, 158-59). Aelius Themison Pammenes was a wealthy benefactor and archon in 160/1, who also had ties to Asia and may have served as Archon of the Panhellenion after 177 AD (Byrne, Roman Citizens of Athens 28-29, 509). He is not known to be a relative of Praxagoras and Demostratos. Herodes belonged to the Kerykes and it appears that he had supported Dionysios’ candidacy for election as dadouch, thereby disrupting the Claudii of Melite’s hold on the office (on the role of the Claudii of Melite in the conflict with Herodes, see Ameling, Herodes Atticus II, 1986, pp. 202-205, and on the role of priesthoods, see K. Clinton, Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries, 1974, 61-63). It appears that the appellants sought to block Dionysios’ election on the grounds that he had not surrendered an existing priesthood before standing. The gaps in the text of ll. 2-3 make the interpretation uncertain, but Marcus seems to acknowledge their standing before ruling against them. The headband (strophion) was a priest’s symbol of office (cf. I Eleusis 483, l. 22). Marcus’ ruling means that people who already held a priesthood and chose to run for a more prestigious one had to resign the existing priesthood before standing, but if they were compelled to run by the Athenian People they did not have to resign the priesthood unless they won the election (cf. K. Harter-Uibopuu, Zeitschrift der Savignystiftung 2008, 228-234). For transitions from one Eleusinian priesthood to a ‘greater’ one, cf. I Eleusis 300, ll. 42-43, 47-51; and for the hierarchy of Eleusinian priesthoods, see I Eleusis 489, ll. 45-67 with notes.

The same technical terms for “appeals” (ekkletoi, literally “calling out”) and “appeal trials” (epheseis, literally “referral”) and appear at fr. e, l. 1-2, and 52-55. The former appears to refer to the submission made by the appellants, the latter to the actual hearing before the emperor. Thus, Marcus Aurelius, finding the appeals to be prima facie justified, felt obliged to hear the cases, although he ultimately decides against the appellants (but see the textual note for alternative reconstructions). [8] The verb perigraphein (“draw a line around”) here translated as “closed,” appears at ll. 9 and 53-54, where it clearly brings an appeal to an end, but it is disputed whether it simply ends the case or refers it back to the court of first instance (cf. S. Follet, Revue philologique, 1979, p. 34). [9] Valerius Mamertinus had been archon in 166/7 and hoplite general in 168/9; his name suggests roots in southern Italy. Philostratos names him as a leader of the prosecution of Herodes at the Trial of Sirmium, alongside Praxagoras and Demostratos (Vit. Soph. 2.1.7, see n. 7). He was a member of the genos of the Eumolpidai, but had tried to switch to being a member of the genos of the Kerykes in order to stand for election as sacred herald (hierokeryx), a position belonging to this genos. Marcus Aurelius states that people are only allowed to switch from one genos to the other if they are descended from both gene. Mamertinus was not descended from the Kerykes, so his case stops there. However, he had already resigned from the Eumolpid genos and given up his existing priesthood (in line with the rule mentioned in the previous ruling). Marcus Aurelius allows him to recover the old priesthood, but warns that this is a special concession and will not be granted in future. Mamertinus’ election had been challenged before an Athenian public court (dikasterion) and the king archon, perhaps as part of the process of scrutiny (dokimasia), but had been permitted (K. Harter-Uibopuu, Zeitschrift der Savignystiftung 2008, 218-228). For a successful transfer between the two gene earlier in the 2^nd century, see I Eleusis 487. On the Athenian court system under the empire, see IG II² 1732-1733; Paus. 1.28.8; J. Fournier, Entre tutelle romain et autonomie civique (2010), 127-61. The king archon's role in adjudicating disputes over priesthoods went back to the Classical Period (Ath. Pol. 57.2; cf. IG II² 1035 with notes for the office's religious role in the Imperial period). Of the appellants Gaius Sentius Attalos was hoplite general in 171/2 AD; Klemes, whose name is the Hellenised form of Latin Clemens, is not otherwise securely attested; and Claudius Chrysippos appears as a property owner in SEG 29.172, l. 4 and probably belonged to a family of Claudii from Phlya (Byrne, Roman Citizens of Athens, 180-81). [10] The Panhellenion was a league of Greek cities, who sent delegates to serve on a council (synhedrion) in Athens (see IG II³ 4, 215 with notes). Julius Damostratos was the archon of the Panhellenion from 173-177 AD and led the process whereby the Panhellenion scrutinised the legitimacy of its own delegates' elections (cf. OGIS 504-507, B ll. 8-9 with note). Ladikos was elected as one of the delegates to represent Athens (his Athenian origin is confirmed by an unpublished inscription from the Athenian Agora: S. Byrne, Athenian Onomasticon, sv. Ladikos). It appears that Sophanes had blocked Ladikos’ election during the scrutiny by demonstrating that he had not fulfilled the age and office-holding criteria required for election. These requirements are attested only here, but Hadrian’s preference for assigning responsibility to ex-magistrates is also seen in Oliver, Constitutions 84, ll. 52-55 from Pergamon. It is unclear what the basis of Ladikos’ appeal was (something to do with the timing of the election or the scrutiny?), but Marcus Aurelius rejects it. Ladikos nevertheless receives his deposit back at l. 51 (see n. 18). [11] Epigonos was another Athenian delegate to the Panhellenion. The prosecutor, Eudemos, was priest of Apollo Patroos of the Gephyraioi and Daphnephoros and perhaps thesmothetes in the mid-2nd century AD (cf. IG II³ 4, 178). On the Quintilii, see n. 5. [12] Athenodoros, who would go on to be archon in 180/1 AD, went to court with Herodes Atticus’ administrators in a case decided by the Panhellenion and Papius Rufus, who had been archon of the Panhellenion from 169 to 173 AD, and lost. He has now appealed the decision to the emperor, but somehow, he has appeared without the minutes or the verdict from the original trial. Rather than delay the case until the next time that the emperor is able to hold court, he delegates the case to the Quintilii (on whom see n. 5). The administrators (dioiketai) are probably the procurators who had carried on legal cases on behalf of Herodes Atticus during his self-imposed exile from Athens, rather than the stewards who managed his estates (K. Harter-Uibopuu, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 125, 2008, 245 n. 102). Perhaps they are to be identified with the freedmen whom Philostratos says Marcus Aurelius blamed for the dispute (see n. 1). Since we are told nothing about the substance of the case, it is unclear why it fell under the jurisdiction of the Panhellenion. The military activities Marcus Aurelius refers to are his command of the ongoing Marcomannic War on the Upper Danube frontier. [13] Nostimos has somehow entered the Areopagos illegitimately. Oliver proposes that he had been appointed by adlection without first holding an archonship (Constitutions, p. 382-83). Alternatively, it may be linked to the changing rules around membership of the Areopagos discussed at fr. e, ll. 57-81, on which see n. 20 (S. Giglio, Atti Accademia Romanistica Constantiniana 4, 1981, 567). It seems that the Quintilii are instructed to determine whether some special dispensation allowing Nostimos to enter the Areopagos is possible (cf. C. P. Jones, ZPE 8, 1971, 169-70); J. H. Oliver's proposal that they are to determine whether an existing dispensation for membership of the Areopagos can enable him to remain a member of the Panhellenion (ZPE 14, 1974, 265-66) does not seem consistent with the Greek text. It is unclear which court Nostimos had appealed from; for suggestions, see K. Harter-Uibopuu, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 125, 2008, 244-45. [14] Euphras’ case does not appear in the surviving test. Perhaps it appeared on the first stele or had been decided on a separate occasion. [15] Marcus Aurelius confirms the Areopagos' decision about the Athenian citizenship of Popillius Pius and others. The Areopagos had probably been called upon to make this decision when the appellants had attempted to enrol in the Areopagos (in connection with the dispute resolved at ll. 57-81 below?). It is not clear why Popillius Pius appealed this case to the emperor, when he had already received a favourable judgement from the Areopagos. It appears that the claim was based on a copy (antigraphon) of a primary document recording all Athenians who held citizenship by birth, perhaps the lexiarchikon (register) referred to in Luc. Zeus Trag. 26 and in Classical-era sources. In the Classical period, recording citizenship was a task of the individual demes (cf. [Demosth.] 57 Against Euboulides 7-15), but they had lapsed by the first century BC. On Oliver's alternative reading (see textual note), citizens were required to prove citizenship by descent by identifying their ancestors' tombs (cf. Ath. Pol. 55.3) and the appellants had been unable to do so (perhaps as a result of destruction of tombs during the raid of the Costoboci into Attica in 170/1 AD).

Popillius Pius is perhaps a descendant of Popillius Theotimos, head of the Epicureans in the 120s AD (cf. (IG II² 1099). The funerary inscription for him and his wife (AIUK 2 (BSA) 14) reveals that both belonged to Marathon, the same deme as Herodes Atticus. [16] Stratolaos has died and there has been a dispute about the terms of his will. He is probably Flavius Stratolaos of Phyle, who served as an exceptionally generous liturgist as an ephebe in 140/1 AD (IG II² 2048 with notes). Because he was a Roman citizen, his will had been made in accordance with Roman law (see Puech, Orateurs 1 with notes). Thus, Marcus Aurelius transliterates the Latin legal term codicilii (an appendix to a will establishing a testamentary gift) and the previous judge, Gavinius Saturninus, is a Roman magistrate (perhaps the procurator hereditatum, responsible for collecting inheritance taxes from Roman citizens), rather than an Athenian one. Aelius Praxagoras (cf. n. 7) disputed gifts that this will had made to the city of Athens, Herodes Atticus, and others, presumably on the basis that he was entitled to them. Marcus Aurelius grants Praxagoras’ appeal, but gives two months for appeal about the will’s gift to Athens. Decisions about who receives the profits from the various estates during the time when they were held by others are kicked back to the Quintilii and Ingenuus (cf. n. 5).

A petition from the Athenians, requests that Pheidimos, who has been exiled to an island, be allowed to return home (ll. 44-47). Marcus Aurelius releases him from the island but only allows him to return to Athens for “examination of the matter” Perhaps he is a relative of Stratolaos (his elderly father?). But this may be an unrelated case (K. Harter-Uibopuu, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 125, 2008, 217, 246). [17] Marcus Aurelius now moves from specific cases to concluding business. Agathokles (l. 47) was apparently the leader of the Athenian embassy that brought all of these disputes before the emperor. Emperors habitually add a note to responses to embassies allowing the ambassadors to recover their expenses from the community unless they had expressly promised to carry out the embassy at their own expense (cf. IG II² 1114 with notes). [18] Appellants also had to submit deposits (cf. Digest 2.8.15; Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten 12.10929, ll. 17-22, where they are fixed at a quarter of the total value of the dispute and IG XII 4.1, 126, ll. 16-20 where there is a flat rate of 2,500 denarii), which were apparently held by the city of Athens and the Areopagos. Marcus Aurelius allows various appellants to recover these deposits; the rest are forfeit. Most of those who recover their deposits had won their cases, but Mamertinus, Ladikos, and Nostimos had lost, while Chrysippos is unmentioned even though he had been part of a successful action (fr. e l. 8). K. Harter-Uibopuu proposes that appellants were permitted to regain their deposits so long as their submissions had been formally valid, regardless of whether they won their cases; Mamertinus’ presence in this list would be a mistake for Chrysippos (Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 125, 2008, 227 n. 44). The case against Aelius Ameinias presumably appeared on the first stele; Euodos only appears on fr. c l. 8; the others are named on the second stele. On ‘closing’ proceedings (perigraphein), see n. 8. [19] Marcus here issues a blanket refusal of all further applications connected with the present dispute and sends them to Ingenuus instead (cf. J. H. Oliver, AJP 100, 1979, 543-58 with parallels). Any related cases submitted after the verdict will go through the usual process and could eventually be heard by Marcus Aurelius. For the relationship between appeals (ekkletoi) and appeal trials (epheseis), see n. 7. [20] Marcus Aurelius lays down a general solution to the question of eligibility for membership of the Areopagos which revolves around a three-generation rule (trigonia). The letter shows that this blocked someone from joining the Areopagos unless he, his father, and his paternal grandfather were well-born (eugenes, i.e. born free). The rule appears to have existed in other cities (l. 63) and to have applied to the Panhellenion too (ll. 76-79). An identical rule is attested for equestrian status in Rome under Tiberius (Plin. Nat. Hist. 33.2.8). This might have been understood as a continuation of Perikles’ citizenship law which restricted Athenian citizenship to men with two citizen grandfathers (Ath. Pol. 26.3, 55.3; Oliver, Marcus Aurelius, pp. 44-57), but it is quite different, since it is limited to the male line and focussed on freeborn status, and determines the right to participate in the Areopagos rather than the right to citizenship. The participation of freedmen and their descendants in public life was a major social controversy in the Roman Imperial period (cf. H. Mouritsen, The Freedman in the Roman World, 2011, 248-78). The infiltration of civic citizenship by freedmen, foreigners, and the illegitimate is parodied by Lucian, Assembly of the Gods and , perhaps specifically with an eye on this Athenian dispute (J. H. Oliver, AJPh 101, 1980, 304-13).

Marcus Aurelius had apparently earlier attempted to apply this rule to the Areopagos strictly (cf. ll. 58-60, 67-71, perhaps to be identified with SEG 30.87). The lack of sufficient candidates meeting these criteria (see n. 21) leads Marcus to relax the rule slightly. The nature of his concession is not totally clear, but it seems that men already in the Areopagos were allowed to remain so long as their fathers were freeborn (ll. 65-66). Even sons of freedmen are allowed to stay, if they became Areopagites before Marcus Aurelius' attempt at strictly enforcing the rule and their membership has not been challenged up till now (ll. 67-69). But men who have already been expelled or voluntarily resigned because of the three-generation rule are not allowed to regain their membership (ll. 69-71). Henceforth, Areopagites will need to be "well-born from both generations,” i.e. father and grandfather, or “from both parents” (l. 66). On the former interpretation, Marcus Aurelius' concession is only a temporary reprieve and the three-generation rule remains in force for future Areopagites. On the latter interpretation, Marcus permanently reduces the entry requirement (cf. Oliver, Marcus Aurelius pp. 20-23; S. Follet, Revue philologique, 1979, 38-39). There is a grace period of a year for ineligible men to leave the Areopagos; anyone who remains after that will be forcibly expelled and have reduced access to civic honours and positions (ll. 72-76). [21] Marcus Aurelius perhaps refers to the Antonine Plague of 165-180 AD (Ameling, Herodes Atticus, p. 195, cf. SEG 19.115 with notes). For relaxations elsewhere, cf. perhaps Digest 50.2.3.2. [22] This seems to indicate that membership of the Areopagos was regulated by the civic courts, not by the Areopagos itself. [23] The emphasis on honours and ranks is typical of Greek cities of the Imperial Period (cf. D. Geagan in D. W. Bradeen and M. F. McGregor, ΦΟΡΟΣ: Tribute... Meritt, 1974, 51-56 for other Athenian evidence). Oliver, Marcus Aurelius, p. 24 identifies contemporary parallels for greater and lesser 'grades' of magistracy in the cities of Western Asia Minor and at Rome. [24] Marcus Aurelius expands on this point in fr. e, ll. 94-101, see n. 26. [25] For the "legal representatives" (syndikoi), cf. IG II² 1100, ll. 55-57. [26] The existence of this postscript is a strong indication that the text was a personal composition of the emperor (W. Williams, ZPE 17, 1975, 52-56). Members of the Council of 500 who have resigned their seats but are actually of free birth are allowed to return ‘for scrutiny,’ apparently meaning that they would be added to the list of men eligible for an annual term on the Council. The reference to the entry requirement for the Council at ll. 79-80 makes clear that this was always intended, but the punctilious Marcus Aurelius worries that it has not been explicitly stated. The Council was less prestigious than the Areopagos in this period, so the entrance requirement is lower, but it still appears that not all citizens were eligible to be councillors (cf. Oliver, Constitutions 193-203, II, l. 18 for restrictions on Assembly attendance).

Added: 6 Mar 2026
Updated: 6 Mar 2026
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